Renting · metropolitan France · 2016 survey
69% found within a year; 10% later; 21% had not found. Private and social renting, ages 18–79, five-year recall: n = 1,208.
Défenseur des droits · 2017 · p. 16 ↗Economics and search times
How long does finding a home take? Why do prices change? Evidence to consider, separating measurements, mechanisms and policy choices.
Literature reviewed: 16 November 2026. Historical evidence is dated; no individual timeline is guaranteed.
Household search time runs from starting the search to finding a home. Marketing time follows one property from listing to withdrawal or sale. Transaction time starts after agreement and ends at completion. These measures cannot be exchanged or averages from different countries and populations added together.
The research for this page did not identify a representative national average for the time needed to rent or buy. Prices and listing counts cannot establish it. “Not established” marks a gap in this research, not proof that no survey exists.
69% found within a year; 10% later; 21% had not found. Private and social renting, ages 18–79, five-year recall: n = 1,208.
Défenseur des droits · 2017 · p. 16 ↗4.5 months on average before the preliminary agreement. Crédit Foncier surveyed around 2,000 households; overall study size, not a specified base for this mean.
Crédit Foncier · 2016 · p. 5 ↗120 days on average after offer acceptance, cited in the 2025 ministerial consultation updated in 2026. Prior property search is excluded.
MHCLG · 2025/2026 ↗This contextual figure is quoted by the ministry; the cited passage does not state a sample size. Transaction rules vary between countries.
These figures do not describe present-day Luxembourg. A share finding within one year is not a mean duration. An old survey cannot predict your journey. Ongoing searches must remain visible to avoid selecting only people who have already succeeded.
Year-on-year change in nominal asking-price indices, comparing the same quarter. Rents concern listings, not all leases; asking sale prices are not recorded transaction prices. Updated with site data, without a forecast.
| Market | Observation period | Annual change | Sources and methodology |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rent · apartments | 2026-T2 | +5.8 % | Read the source ↗ |
| Buy · apartments | 2026-T2 | -0.3 % | Read the source ↗ |
| Buy · houses | 2026-T2 | -0.4 % | Read the source ↗ |
Latest official publication : 2026-09-24 · Sources last checked : 2026-11-15
Data and methodology →Housing is tied to a location and lasts a long time. Building requires land, permissions, infrastructure and time. When short-run supply responds weakly, extra demand can mainly raise prices. Outcomes depend on local constraints and the horizon.
For the same principal and term, a higher interest rate raises the payment. Housing purchasing power also depends on income, equity and credit conditions. Prices do not respond immediately or mechanically: transaction volumes, expectations and supply also matter.
Homes and households differ: budgets, locations, guarantees and availability need to match. Moving costs, commuting time and transaction costs affect mobility. An average hides long searches, refusals and abandoned attempts.
Assistance, new supply, affordable housing, taxation and rent regulation work through different channels. Demand support can partly flow into prices when supply is constrained. Evaluate access, cost, quality, mobility and building, separating short and long horizons.
CAE · Trannoy / Wasmer · 2013 ↗
Their 2013 CAE note connects supply, mobility and support; it recommends testing rent caps before wider adoption. A set of questions rather than a result transferable directly to Luxembourg.
Personal note from Sitraka Forler: “Alain Trannoy was my professor.” Sitraka Forler is responsible for this page’s selection and presentation.
“Next to bombing, rent control is the most efficient technique for destroying cities”.
Assar Lindbeck repeats this phrase in a 2017 text (p. 2). It is a polemical statement about indirect effects, not an estimate or a universal conclusion about every policy. Lindbeck · 2017 · p. 2 ↗
San Francisco · Diamond, McQuade and Qian (2019): less displacement of protected tenants, but 15% less rental supply among affected landlords. A 1994 reform, not a Luxembourg forecast.
American Economic Review · 2019 ↗Paris · Apur/CESAER/LéP/SeLoger (2026): rents estimated 5% below the no-regulation counterfactual, July 2019–June 2025. This does not mean rents fell 5% over time.
Apur · n° 288 · avril 2026 ↗Policies differ: strict freezes, limited increases or caps on new leases, exemptions and enforcement. Protecting incumbents and helping newcomers are distinct tests. Rents alone cannot establish effects on supply, quality or overall welfare.
A future survey should record the search start, distinguish renting/buying and private/social housing, follow unresolved cases, document recruitment and report median, dispersion and the share still searching. Voluntary site visitors alone are not a representative national sample. No new questionnaire is collected here.